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ABSTRACT
This article outlines the deepening political, social and economic crisis facing Ven-
ezuela. Overall, we argue that both government and opposition must take respon-
sibility for the present crisis as both have failed to offer coherent policy responses 
to the problems facing the country. The government has failed to address the crisis 
with sufficient rigor, and seems more concerned with maintaining power, while 
the opposition MUD continues to offer the removal of the government as its sole 
solution to the crisis. Yet its policy proposals are poorly developed and do not offer 
long-term solutions to the country’s problems. Finally, we suggest that the contin-
uation of the Vatican/UNASUR-sponsored dialogue is the best way for Venezuela 
to advance if it wishes to restore economic and social stability and reduce political 
tension. 
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RESUMEN
Este artículo esboza la profundización de la crisis política, social y económica que enfrenta 
Venezuela. En general, argumentamos que tanto el gobierno como la oposición deben asu-
mir la responsabilidad de la crisis actual, ya que ambos han fracasado en ofrecer respuestas 
políticas coherentes a los problemas que enfrenta el país. El gobierno no ha logrado abordar 
la crisis con suficiente rigor, y parece estar más preocupado por mantener el poder, mientras 
que la oposición MUD sigue ofreciendo la eliminación del gobierno como su única solución a 
la crisis. Sin embargo, sus propuestas de política están poco desarrolladas y no ofrecen solu-
ciones a largo plazo a los problemas del país. Por último, sugerimos que la continuación del 
diálogo patrocinado por el Vaticano / UNASUR es la mejor vía para que Venezuela avance 
si desea restablecer la estabilidad económica y social y reducir la tensión política.
Palabras clave: Venezuela, crisis, Maduro, MUD, dialogo 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Successive annual reviews of Venezuela in this journal have tracked the ongoing 
political crisis in the country due to the constant confrontations between the 
ruling PSUV (Partido Socialista Unida de Venezuela) and the Opposition MUD 
coalition (Mesa de la Unidad Democrática). Nevertheless, Cyr (2013), in her review, 
concludes that Chávez’s revolutionary project would likely outlast his time in 
office, due to ambivalent or positive public attitudes to government policies 
and the lack of a clearly defined alternative from the opposition. However, with 
Chávez’s death in March 2013, she raises concerns (Cyr 2013: 387) regarding 
his successor Nicolás Maduro’s ability to hold the myriad opposition and 
chavista forces in check as Chávez had succeeded in doing, after the former had 
narrowly defeated Henrique Capriles Radonski of the Primero Justicia (PJ) party 
(representing the MUD) in the April 2013 presidential elections. Maduro’s slim 
majority (a mere 1.5 per cent) was contested, with U.S. support, by Capriles and 
the MUD, leading to violent opposition-led protests (Hetland 2016, 17 August: 
8). 
While these eventually abated, a fresh wave of protests seeking Maduro’s 
removal erupted in early 2014 following the ruling PSUV’s strong showing in 
municipal elections in December 2013 (Hetland 2016, 17 August: 9). Maduro 
survived these protests, which resulted in the deaths of 43 people, including 
opposition and government supporters along with members of the security 
forces. Presciently, both Cyr (2013) and Sagarzazu (2014), in their respective 
yearly reviews for the RCP, noted that the MUD had made considerable electoral 
advances, losing key elections by small margins and beating the PSUV in areas 
where before Chávez had won easily. This tendency came to spectacular fruition 
in the December 2015 parliamentary elections when the PSUV was soundly 
beaten by the MUD, which gained a two-thirds supermajority in the National 
Assembly (AN)—the first time the opposition had achieved such a position since 
Hugo Chávez came to power in 1999. This resounding majority would allow 
the opposition-controlled legislature to change some fundamental laws and 
even aim for the removal of Maduro. In this deeply polarized scenario, with the 
PSUV controlling the other four of Venezuela’s five state “powers” (executive, 
judiciary, electoral and citizens’ powers), 2016 has witnessed a deepening of the 
political impasse. The year was thus characterized by a variety of actions on the 
part of both government and opposition aimed at neutralizing, preventing or 
reversing the actions of the other, most notably opposition attempts to remove 
Maduro from power and government reactions.
But while Cyr (2013) and Sagarzazu (2014) describe a country mired in an 
intractable political crisis, Sánchez Urribarrí (2016) shows how this had escalated 
into a comprehensive socio-economic crisis. The overwhelming nature of this 
crisis has put the PSUV’s hold on power even more in doubt. In this article we 
show how 2016 was marked by the continuance of the socio-economic crisis 
described by Sánchez Urribarrí (2016), characterized by a continued economic 
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slump, currency exchange difficulties, very high inflation, continued shortages 
of a wide variety of goods including food and medicines, increasing poverty, 
and high levels of violence. This socio-economic crisis has been accompanied 
by continued political uncertainly, opposition-led protests, and a worsening 
regional and international context for the Bolivarian government. 
The article will look at each of these issues in turn. Following an examination 
of the contours of the economic and social crisis in Venezuela, as well as its 
position in the international context, we suggest that not only the government 
but also the opposition must take responsibility for creating, perpetuating 
and worsening the crisis by failing to offer coherent policy responses to the 
problems facing the country. As such, we examine the government’s reaction 
to the crisis, first providing some background as to how it has managed it so 
far, and then looking at particular policy initiatives from this year, reaction to 
these, and personnel changes within government. We suggest that Maduro 
has surrounded himself with personnel who face high exit costs should the 
PSUV lose power, thereby ensuring their support for his remaining in office. 
We will then review the actions of the MUD regarding the crisis, both in terms 
of their declared strategies and some of the specific laws which they attempted 
to enact to resolve it. Most notable here is the MUD’s belief that the route to 
resolving the crisis is through the removal of the government. This belief, and 
the corresponding multi-layered strategy set out in the opposition’s Hoja de 
Ruta Democrática of March 2016, led to its doomed attempt to initiate a recall 
referendum against President Maduro. We will also examine some key policies 
that it attempted to enact in the AN, most notably its Amnesty Law and Housing 
Law, and how both of these only contributed to a greater sense of polarization 
rather than helping to resolve pressing problems. Finally, we will review the 
national dialogue which took place under the auspices of UNASUR (Unión de 
Naciones Suramericanas) and the Vatican, and argue that this is the only feasible 
way for Venezuela to advance if it wishes to restore economic and social stability 
and reduce political tension. Let U.S. begin then with the economic and social 
situation in the country in 2016.
II. ECONOMY AND SOCIETY
Santos (2017: 61) lays out the country’s precarious economic situation in stark 
terms: crude oil, which accounts for around 90 percent of Venezuela’s exports, 
making it the country’s principal hard currency earner, descended from US$88 
a barrel in 2015 to $34 in 2016, more than halving national income in one year 
alone. The IMF reported inflation at 720 per cent, with food inflation peaking at 
1,400 in 2016 (Santos 2017: 61). Foreign debt repayments averaged about US$10 
billion per year, and capital flight is estimated at US$23 billion between 2003 
and 2013. Both latter phenomena draw scarce dollars away from paying for 
food imports, with Venezuela having little domestic food production capacity 
to replace it. According to Hetland (2016, 17 August) there was a 40 percent 
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drop in imports in the first half of 2016, which represents a 60 percent drop 
since 2012. As a result, food and shortages of other vital goods continued, with 
an estimated 80 percent scarcity index (Hetland 2016, 17 August). While food 
is available on the unregulated market, Venezuelans are finding it increasingly 
difficult to afford the high prices there (Santos 2017: 61). 
Poverty, Santos (2017: 58) states, is at 75 percent, citing a figure from work by 
Venezuelan academic and opposition activist, Luis Pedro España and colleagues, 
effectively wiping out any gains made during the Chávez period. Moreover, the 
homicide rates continues to be among the highest globally, with Caracas among 
the most violent cities in the world and seven other Venezuelan cities in the top 
50 (Santos 2017). Though Santos (2017) admits his figures are “highly imperfect 
estimations” from private sources, the Venezuelan government has simply 
stopped releasing many official statistics. By contrast, what governmental 
statistics have been published paint a far rosier picture (INE 2017), pegging 
household income poverty at around 33 per cent for the first trimester of 2015 
(compared to 29.4 per cent in the first trimester of 2014), estimating inequality 
at Gini index 0.381 for 2015, a slight reduction from 0.409 in 2013 and one of the 
lowest in the region, and indicating an average rise in inflation of almost 122 
percent for 2015, with food inflation at almost 219 per cent (INE 2017).
III. NATIONAL POLITICS
National politics continued to be characterized by extreme polarization, despite 
a few fitful and unsuccessful attempts at negotiations, brokered by the Vatican 
and others (see below).1
The year began with the arrival of the opposition majority to the AN, which 
was initially an MUD supermajority (i.e. two thirds of the unicameral chamber) 
that would have been sufficiently large to have allowed them to change some 
fundamental laws. The officialist-controlled Venezuelan Supreme Court (TSJ) 
reduced this by three deputies, however, due to irregularities in their elections, 
which lowered the MUD’s majority below supermajority status. This prompted 
the AN to unilaterally reincorporate the suspended deputies in July, leading the 
TSJ to “declare Congress illegitimate,” effectively neutering that body and any 
legislation it may have passed. While the three congress members eventually 
resigned their seats in November on the promise of fresh elections (Reuters 
2016, 16 November), AN actions still remain without any legal effect and the 
promised elections have not transpired. 
At the end of February, the MUD announced an agreed strategy to remove 
Maduro from power consisting of four elements: resignation, amendment to 
the Constitution, removal for abandonment of his post, and a recall referendum 
1 Much of the following account is based on López Maya’s (2017) useful timeline provided in LASA Forum.
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(see below). Of these strategies, only the recall referendum process advanced 
in any meaningful way, and it would dominate politics until October, when 
it was finally abandoned. The recall process was activated by the MUD with 
the Venezuelan National Electoral Council (CNE) on 9 March 2016, over two 
months after the new AN was installed. The process commenced at the end of 
April, with the collection of signatures of one percent of the national population 
in support of the referendum. The government-controlled CNE, however, found 
600,000,of the 1,957,779 signatures collected invalid (or over 25 percent), which 
meant that this stage of the process was not completed until 24 August.
The next step for the opposition was to collect the signatures of 20 per cent 
of registered voters, a process that required completion by the end of October, 
with signatures approved by the end of November if the referendum itself was 
to be held by the end of the year. This timing was important as a referendum 
victory before year’s end would have meant the removal of Maduro and new 
elections, which the opposition would probably win. If not, Maduro’s vice 
president would replace him, making the whole process much less appealing, 
if not meaningless, from the MUD’s point of view. Yet, unexpectedly, in 
October, the CNE found 53,658 irregular signatures, effectively suspending the 
entire process indefinitely. Additionally, the CNE had earlier announced the 
postponement of the regional and municipal elections due that December until 
an undetermined date in early 2017. With these moves, plus a legal prohibition 
on a number of MUD politicians including, including the governor of Miranda 
stat and presidential candidate,Henrique Capriles, the National Assembly 
declared Venezuela in a coup d’état situation and requested international help. 
This was not long in coming, when the Secretary General of the Organization of 
American States (OAS), Luis Almagro, called for the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter to be invoked against Venezuela—as he had previously attempted but 
failed to do in May —a process that could lead to Venezuela’s suspension from 
that organization. 
The suspension of the recall referendum process led to a period of intense 
activity both within Venezuela and outside the country. In Venezuela, a special 
session of the AN was held on 23 October, calling for outside intervention from 
key international organizations such as the OAS. A variety of demonstrations 
were held and on 28 October, including a general strike that was seen as only 
partly successful. The AN also began a process of putting Maduro on “trial” for 
abandonment of his post, as he had left the country shortly after the termination 
of the recall process. These events and the grim social statistics cited above 
were depicted in the international media in apocalyptic terms.2 Domestic 
turbulence coincided with stark political realignment elsewhere, which would 
shift Venezuela’s balance of power in the international arena. Two of the most 
2 “Venezuela’s downward spiral,” declared the New York Times (2016, 17 May) in an Editorial; “Venezuela on 
the brink” echoed The Guardian (Watts, 2016, 11 October); “Venezuela is lurching closer and closer to chaos,” 
opined the Washington Post (2016, 26 December); with El País in Madrid quite simply declaring “Chaos in 
Venezuela” (2016, 20 December). These are just some examples.
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geopolitically important countries in Latin America, Argentina and Brazil, turned 
sharply to the ideological right in 2016, with the elections of Mauricio Macri in 
the former and the installation of Michel Temer as President in the latter, after 
a questionable impeachment process involving PT President Dilma Rousseff. 
In September, the founding members of Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay 
and Uruguay) agreed that Venezuela would not assume the pro tempore 
presidency of the bloc, and by early December Venezuela had been suspended 
from the organization. The presidency passed to Argentina (Aljazeera 2016, 3 
November) despite Venezuela’s energetic protestations (Boothroyd-Rojas 2016, 
16 September). Meanwhile, the Secretary General of the OAS, Luis Almagro, 
continued to seek the application of the Democratic Charter against Venezuela, 
declaring in August that democracy in Venezuela had “ended” (BBC Mundo 
2016, 23 August). Finally, with the election of property tycoon and reality TV 
star Donald J. Trump of the Republican Party as President of the United States 
in November, and Republican domination of both Houses of Congress, most 
analysts expect a hardening that country’s position towards Venezuela (Gill 
2016, 29 December; Woody 2016, 19 December). 
Venezuela fared better with UNASUR, however, despite the changes in 
government in these key countries. In 2016, UNASUR was fundamental in 
facilitating dialogue between the PSUV executive and the MUD-controlled 
National Assembly, and its Secretary General, Colombian Ernesto Samper, 
insisted on the legitimacy of the Venezuelan state institutions and of Maduro as 
the country’s legitimate President (Zuzunaga Ruiz 2016, 27 October). Similarly, 
as Timothy Gill (2016) argues, the Venezuelan government retains regional 
allies in Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, and can still rely on support 
from Russia and China (Gill 2017, 12 January). Hence, while the international 
context for the country has changed quite radically in 2016, it still retains some 
external support in international fora.
IV. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO CRISIS
Before turning to the government’s response to the crisis detailed above, it 
is first necessary to critically review the origins of the crisis and the role the 
government has played in its development. On the government’s side, it blames 
both the domestic opposition and the U.S. for perpetrating economic warfare as 
the root cause of the crisis. Firstly, private producers opposed to the government 
have engaged in hoarding of food and basic goods, particularly in periods 
before elections (Hetland 2016, 17 August). Secondly, the U.S. government has 
fuelled the crisis by engaging in sanctions of high-ranking government officials, 
citing the Obama administration’s qualification of Venezuela as a national 
security threat to the United States. These sanctions discourage European and 
U.S. banks and investors from doing business in the country “at a time when 
Venezuela is in desperate need of dollars but is prevented from gaining access 
to them by Washington” (Hetland 2016, 17 August). Pro-government sources 
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have drawn parallels between the economic war in Venezuela and U.S. efforts to 
topple Allende’s government in Chile in the 1970s, when President Nixon and 
Secretary of State Kissinger sought to “make the economy scream” (Hetland 
2016, 17 August).
Yet many seasoned observers question the government’s claims regarding 
economic warfare as the principle cause of the crisis, suggesting it is but one 
of the factors behind the current crisis (Hetland 2016, August). According to 
these experts, the single greatest cause of Venezuela’s economic meltdown is 
mismanagement of its currency (Velasco 2016, 25 October; Hetland 2016, 17 
August; Weisbrot 2016, 23 October; Buxton 2016). While currency manipulation 
was first undertaken as an emergency response to the oil industry strike of 2002, 
by 2016 it had become a byzantine three-tiered currency control system: the 
lower official rate of 10:1 (bolivares to dollars) applies to “essential imports”; 
a second official rate for non-essential imports known as DiCom, rising via a 
“managed float” from 200 to 697: 1 at the time of writing; and finally, a fluctuating 
black-market rate which currently stands at 4,229:1. The enormous gulf in rates 
creates serious incentives for corruption whereby businesses and state/military 
officials with access to dollars at the lower official rate can then resell them 
at black market rates, making enormous profits (Grandin 2016, 16 December; 
Hetland 2016, 17 August). The outcome is a shortage of dollars for food imports, 
lengthy queues for the little food that is available, and a greatly inflated black 
market for those same goods. As Velasco (2016, 25 October) notes, the oil boom 
“simultaneously masked and fed corruption as dollars were plentiful. But when 
dollars became scarce as oil prices plummeted, the breach no longer held.”
So how has the government responded to this escalating crisis? In February, 
the government increased gasoline prices for the first time in 20 years by 
over 6000% (Pourcelot 2016, 10 March), a move which was regarded as an 
unfortunate but necessary step in the right direction. In March, it devalued the 
protected Bolivar Fuerte (BF) from a rate of 6.3:1 to 10:1 (bolivares to dollars) 
and introduced the floating official DiCom rate. This latter adjustment has been 
largely unsuccessful, as “the vast majority of the government’s dollars are given 
away at the official rate of 10, and so there is very little to supply the DiCOM 
market” (Weisbrot 2016, 4 May). In June a specially commissioned UNASUR 
team of experts, many of them (such as Weisbrot) identifying with the left, 
presented a comprehensive set of proposals to the government to help manage 
the crisis (Emersberger 2016, 19 July). Among the recommendations involving 
monetary policy were an immediate end to the tiered currency system and the 
free floating of the BF on the markets, a lifting of price controls and of all energy 
subsidies (not just gasoline), with direct government subsidies to consumers 
to soften the blow, and the indexing of all salaries to the monthly inflation rate 
until inflation stabilizes. Additional recommendations included the selling of all 
non-strategic assets, a tax on financial transactions, wealth taxes, and assistance 
for the informal employment sector which developed under the present crisis 
(such as the reselling of price-controlled goods) (Emersberger 2016, 19 July). The 
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government declined to adopt any of the UNASUR experts’ recommendations, 
making it one of “the most astonishingly static governments Latin America has 
seen for many years” (Buxton 2016: 15).
There are a number of reasons for this inactivity. First, many in the government 
saw the UNASUR proposed reforms as a “paquetazo” resembling IMF neoliberal 
reforms of the past (Weisbrot 2016, 23 October). This problem is particularly 
acute as Maduro cannot be seen to deviate from Chávez’s anti-neoliberal 
positions, for fear of alienating his base (Smilde 2015). Second, Hetland (2016, 17 
August) suggests that too many people employed by the state, and, in particular, 
the military, benefit from the current system, mostly through corruption. Given 
Maduro’s political and institutional weaknesses, he cannot risk alienating the 
latter group, for fear of their heeding opposition calls for a coup (Hetland 
2016, 17 August). Whatever the reasons, the result has been policy paralysis 
with little real advance in solving the overall socio-economic crisis affecting the 
Venezuelan people.
The government has, however, made several attempts to respond to the more 
immediate effects of this crisis. These have included an increased focus on 
mining, the development of the Comités Locales de Abastecimiento y Producción or 
CLAPs, as well as the demonetization of the 100 bolivar note and closing of land 
borders to stem the flow of Venezuelan goods illegally crossing into Colombia. 
In June, the creation of a new mining ministry officially titled Ministry for 
the Development of Ecological Mining (Boothroyd-Rojas 2016, 9 June) was 
emblematic of the former strategy. This was in response to a new US$4.5 billion 
transnational mega-mining project in Bolivar state announced in February, 
which the government hopes will mitigate the fall in oil revenues (Hetland 2016, 
17 August). As Boothroyd-Rojas (2016, 9 June) notes, the government has faced 
a raft of criticisms from social movements, ecological activists and indigenous 
groups, who complain they were not consulted regarding the project. A more 
pointed criticism of this effort is even if it succeeds, it will deepen rather than 
lessen Venezuela’s dependence on extractive industries for trade (Grandin 2016, 
16 December; Webber 2016, 18 September; Zibechi 2016).
In April, the government opened numerous CLAPs, which are partnerships 
between grassroots organizations and the government to provide an alternative 
food distribution network in all 24 states (Schiavoni and Camcarro 2016, 7 
November). The objective of these is to curb the black market and to get food 
items directly into people’s homes at government regulated prices. Though 
critics argue that the CLAPs suffer from clientelism, favoring households 
who support the government, the Council on Hemispheric Affairs noted in 
October that the CLAPs have certainly alleviated some of the shortages, and 
the frustrations associated with them (COHA 2016, 20 October). Nevertheless, 
the CLAPs do not overcome the fundamental problem that drives scarcity and 
shortages, which is a dependency on the export market and the lack of domestic 
production (Smilde 2016, 5 July). While, in the longer term, CLAPs are intended 
to engage in local food production and processing, and there are a number 
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of initiatives introduced in that direction, these are probably limited in their 
capacity to overcome shortages in the context of currency and price controls 
(Schiavoni and Camcarro 2016, 7 November).
In December, Maduro ordered a closing of the border with Colombia in order 
to prevent the illegal selling of subsidized Venezuelan goods in Colombia. 
In order to stop the hoarding of the currency in border towns, Maduro also 
announced that the 100 bolivar note would no longer be legal tender. Citizens 
were given ten days to exchange the more than six billion notes in circulation, 
which represented around 50 percent of currency in circulation according to 
the BBC (2016, 15 February). This caused economic and social turmoil, with 
protests and looting breaking out in rural border areas. Furthermore, Smilde 
(2016, 20 December) points to the failure in the move’s expressed logic as few 
would seek “to hoard a currency that lost sixty percent of its value in the past 
two months” and would instead look to spend it as quickly as possible.
V. CABINET AND MINISTERIAL RE-SHUFFLES: HIGH EXIT 
COSTS, CORRUPTION, AND THE MAINTENANCE OF POWER
The tame efforts by the government to tackle the currency situation were 
accompanied by changes to important cabinet positions from the end of 2015 
through to the beginning of 2017. Following the December 2015 defeat in the 
National Assembly elections, Maduro called on all ministers to “make their post 
available to initiate a process of restructuring, renovation and relaunch of the 
entire national government” (as cited in Holldack 2015, 9 December). In early 
January 2016, Maduro appointed Luis Salas, a professor from the Bolivarian 
University of Venezuela, as Vice President for the Economy, as well as head 
of the newly-created Ministry of Productive Economy. Salas echoed Maduro’s 
views regarding the economic war and the crisis, and was an adherent to 
the currency and price controls. Ex- businessman Miguel Pérez Abad took 
the position of Minister of Industry and Commerce, while Jesus Faría was 
established as the head of the newly commissioned Ministry of Foreign Trade 
and Investment. However, by early March, Maduro had replaced Luis with the 
more moderate Pérez Abad. Yet Pérez Abad only remained in this role until 
early August, dashing hopes for a free float of the Bolivar for which he had 
tirelessly advocated. Soon thereafter, his replacement, Carlos Faría, suggested 
that a free float would be highly unlikely (Hetland 2016, 17 August).
Meanwhile, the increasing role of the military in positions of political power 
has continued in 2016. In August, Maduro appointed General Nestor Reverol 
as Minister for Interior Justice, days after a U.S. Federal District court issued 
an indictment against Reverol over allegations of accepting bribes from drug-
traffickers between 2008 and 2010. While Maduro highlighted the general’s 
experience as the director of Venezuela’s National Anti-Drug Office (ONA) and 
Commander of the National Guard (Koerner 2016, 3 August), some analysts 
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suggest that Reverol’s appointment highlights Maduro’s unwillingness to tackle 
corruption in the military (Smilde 2016, 15 August; Hetland 2016, 17 August; 
Ramsey 2017, 12 January). Indeed, Smilde (2016, 15 August) detects a pattern 
of Maduro’s appointment of military personnel targeted by U.S. sanctions 
because of criminal accusations. This, he suggests is in order to build a core 
team whose exit costs are too high to allow them to desert the government, as 
they would likely face charges in the U.S. if the MUD were to achieve executive 
power. Three cases illustrate this: in July, Maduro designated General Antonio 
Benavides Torres as the Chief Commander of the Bolivarian National Guard, 
while General Gustavo González Lopez was elevated to Minister for Interior 
Justice, both of whom were subject to U.S. sanctions (Smilde 2016, 15 August). 
Most notably, in January 2017, Maduro replaced Vice President Aristobulo 
Istúriz, a long serving member of PSUV governments, with the more radical 
Tareck El Aissami, placing the latter second in line to the presidency in the event 
of Maduro’s removal. El Aissami has also been linked to drug trafficking by 
the US—a charge he denies—and was added to the U.S. Treasury’s counter-
narcotics Office of Foreign Assets Control list in February 2017. The appointment 
of El Aissami would likely be welcomed by the more radical end of the chavista 
support base, thereby boosting Maduro’s legitimacy as the guardian of Chávez’s 
vision for the country. Moreover, The MUD may be less likely to insist on a 
recall for Maduro as they would not want to see someone even more radical 
replace him. Also, given the charges of drug-trafficking faced by El Aissami, 
much like the military personnel appointed to government positions detailed 
above, he too would face high exit costs if the MUD were to gain control of the 
executive (Ramsey 2017, 12 January).
Smilde (2016, 15 August) notes that Maduro has cultivated a “loyal core among 
security officials” that extends beyond those on U.S. blacklists; in July, Defence 
Minister General Vladimir Padrino López took over as head of the “Grand 
Supply Mission,” thereby taking control of Venezuela’s entire food supply 
system. Since then, the Venezuelan Armed Forces (FANB) have been charged 
with “regulating food and medicine distribution and overseeing all major ports 
across the country” (Ramsey 2017, 12 August). In January 2017, the creeping 
presence of military officials in high-ranking political positions continued, with 
Maduro designating Air Force Coronel Ramon Celestino Velasquez as Minister 
of Eco-socialism and Water, and Admiral Cezar Salazar Coll as head of the 
Ministry of Public Works (Koerner 2017). Both Ramsey (2017, 12 August) and 
Smilde (2016, 15 August) raise concerns that by allowing the military to oversee 
food production, Maduro has “made the armed forces a direct stakeholder in 
the permanence of the regime,” whereby military officials have such capacity 
for economic gain that they would side with the government instead of the 
people if there is social upheaval (Ramsey 2017, 12 August). Velasco concludes 
that the real reason behind these decisions may be to “feed the corruption that 
keeps [the government’s] inner core afloat” (Grandin 2016, 16 December).
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VI. THE OPPOSITION’S RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS
While the government’s response to the crisis has been examined in detail, 
the MUD’s response has not received the same attention, particularly in 
mainstream accounts both journalistic and academic. What have their proposals 
been, especially as they now dominate at least one arm of government, the 
National Assembly? Here we will examine a number of MUD policy and 
strategy documents, including their national party platforms and their strategy 
for the removal of President Maduro from power. We will also review two 
laws the Assembly passed but which were referred to the Supreme Court by 
the President and found unconstitutional: the Amnesty Law that aimed to 
release and absolve all those imprisoned for violent and other acts aimed at 
overthrowing the government, and a Housing Law that effectively would have 
privatized all public housing. First, however, it is necessary to provide a quick 
review of the characteristics, strategies and objectives of the MUD, in order to 
help frame the subsequent discussion on the MUD’s responses to the crisis. 
Cannon (2014) finds that the Venezuelan opposition displayed the following 
characteristics, strategies and objectives since the beginnings of the Bolivarian 
period. First, in terms of characteristics, it is both parliamentary and non-
parliamentary, with a varying emphasis on each of these parts over time. The 
MUD coalition was founded in 2008, with about 30 affiliated parties. These 
vary from the social democratic Podemos, to extreme libertarian groups 
such as Leopoldo López’s Voluntad Popular, to the more mainstream, but 
neoliberal Primero Justicia and Acción Democratica. Second, strategies varied 
along three lines: parliamentary, mobilizational and extra-constitutional; that 
is, respectively, participation in elections, demonstrations and other peaceful 
protests and, finally, illegal strategies involving violence, including the April 
2002 coup, resulting in around 30 deaths, and the La Salida uprising of January/
February 2014, which resulted in the deaths of around 44 people. It is this final 
strategy that seems to predominate now. 
Third, while strategies diverged and strategic direction was often a source 
of tension within the opposition coalition, all shared the same objective—the 
removal of the government. This remained, in the eyes of all members of the 
opposition, the principal means by which Venezuela’s multiple economic 
and social problems could be solved. Once the government was removed, a 
liberal democratic regime and a market-based economy would be (re)installed, 
both of which are seen as the natural political and economic regimes for the 
country. Nevertheless, there would be a pronounced emphasis on poverty 
alleviation, including some elements of continuity with the present Bolivarian 
regime. Proposals here included the maintenance of the 1999 Constitution, the 
commitment to keep the state oil company, PDVSA, in public hands, and the 
continuation of some of the more notable Social Missions to maintain the fight 
against poverty.
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A clear divergence is evident, however, within the MUD coalition both in terms 
of political strategy and socio-economic policy. More radical elements, such 
as Maria Corina Machado, the liberal independent politician, and Leopoldo 
López’s Popular Will party, preferred mobilizational and extra-constitutional 
means over institutional strategies. Moreover, they advocate a much brusquer 
“transition” to marketization, including the immediate privatization of all 
publicly owned enterprises, including PDVSA, as well as, more recently, the 
drawing up of a new constitution and trials of government ministers (Ellner 
2017: 39). In sum, while the MUD is united in its objective of removing the 
government from power, viewing it as the main cause of the crisis, it remains 
divided on the means to achieve this and the degree to which the economy and 
society should be marketized and de-Bolivarianized, and at what pace.
These characteristics, strategies and objectives have remained constant up to 
and including 2016, as can be seen both in their strategy and policy documents, 
including legislation passed by the newly MUD-dominated AN. In October 
2015, the
MUD released a short document, entitled “Legislative offer for change” (MUD 
2015), outlining their policy platforms for the legislative elections scheduled for 
the following December. Divided into nine policy areas such as food and other 
goods shortages, security, incomes for workers and pensioners, public services, 
housing, corruption and, last but not least, “political prisoners,” the opposition 
articulated three main themes identified in the above account—reintroduction 
of market mechanisms, poverty alleviation and the removal of the government. 
For example, market mechanisms are offered as a panacea for the shortages 
plaguing the country, such as cutting “red tape,” reducing taxes, speeding up 
licenses and permits, and removing any possibility of punishment for hoarding 
or other practices identified by the government as part of the “economic war,” 
such as expropriations of businesses or other such penalties. Decentralization is 
suggested for public services, which would be put out to tender to the private 
sector or funded through strategic partnerships between public and private 
sector in the form of Public-Private Partnerships (PPI’s). Yet it was people’s 
dissatisfaction with the government, rather than market-friendly policies, which 
allowed the opposition to win so convincingly in the December 2015 legislative 
elections (Davies 2015, 7 December).  
Upon taking office, therefore, the MUD prioritized the removal of the 
government and the proposal for amnesty for MUD-linked prisoners. On 8 
March 2016, two months after the installation of the new Assembly, the MUD 
released what it called its Hoja de Ruta Democrática (MUD 2016, 13 August) or 
“Democratic Roadmap” for the removal of Maduro from the presidency. In this 
document, the MUD set out three parallel strategies to remove the government, 
in the following order: a “wide national popular mobilisation” demanding the 
President’s resignation; the passing of a Constitutional Amendment “voted for 
and defended by the people” (although by which means is not specified) to 
shorten the presidential mandate and hold elections in 2016; and the initiation 
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of a Recall Referendum (RR) and passage of a Referendums Law to ensure that 
this would not be “blocked or held up” (by the government presumably). The 
delays in the issuing of this document, and the variety of alternatives offered, 
with the RR coming notably last in the list, reflected the internal divisions 
within the MUD coalition around the prioritization of the different strategies 
previously noted (Ellner 2017: 39).
Not long after this, on 30 March, the so-called Amnesty and National 
Reconciliation Law (Asamblea Nacional 2016a) was passed after a heated debate 
in the NA. This was introduced to deal with the problem of the opposition-
denominated “political prisoners” —that is individuals jailed by state authorities 
for organizing and/or participating in violent acts aimed at overthrowing 
the government, but which the opposition claims were “political” acts and 
therefore not crimes in the accepted sense and so not subject to established state 
punishment. The best-known of over 100 such prisoners is the leader of far-
right libertarian party Voluntad Popular, Leopoldo López. This law, framed by 
advice to Venezuelans from Pope Francis to embrace “peace, coexistence and 
dialogue” (Preamble), aimed to grant amnesty for all acts, apart from murder and 
serious injury, which respond to “a political motivation” (Preamble, point a.), 
and committed since 1 January, 1999 (the day on which Hugo Chávez assumed 
power for the first time) until the activation of the law. While the list of crimes 
specified for amnesty is much too long to relate here, it is worthwhile listing some 
of the more notable ones (Chapter II, Article 4), including: “property damage” 
(Art 4: j); “Importation, fabrication, carrying, control of (detentación), provision 
or hiding of explosive and incendiary artifacts” (Art 4; l); “use of minors for 
the commission of crimes” (Art. 4: o); the use of fire to cause common damage 
(Art. 4: p); treachery (Art. 4: q); rebellion (Art 4: r); encouraging and facilitating 
rebellion in the armed forces, including the revealing of military secrets (Art. 4: 
s); illegal carrying of arms and their unauthorized use (Art. 4: v); and, damage 
to installations of the national grid (Art. 4: w). In article 7, a list is provided of 33 
demonstrations, protests and violent uprisings which took place from 2003 until 
2014, many of which led to deaths and injuries of citizens and security forces, 
during which the above listed crimes to be amnestied were committed. Later, 
some better-known events are listed including the 2002 Coup (Art. 10), the oil 
strike and lockout carried out in 2002 and 2003 (Art. 11), and the events related to 
the early 2014 La Salida campaign led by Leopoldo López, (Art. 12), all of which 
also caused deaths, injuries and severe economic losses. If anything, these lists 
illustrate the breadth and intensity of the campaign waged by the opposition 
and opposition-linked groups against the government. As mentioned above, 
acts of murder and serious injuries are excluded (Chapter 3; Art. 5), as well 
as crimes against humanity, war crimes and serious offences against human 
rights perpetrated by the security forces or government (Chapter 1; Art. 3). 
Nevertheless, there is a clear aim by the opposition to absolve all opposition-
linked groups and activists of any criminal responsibility for these subversive 
and coercive acts which few governments in the world could possibly accept. 
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Unsurprisingly, then, the executive rejected the Amnesty Law, with Maduro 
charging that it was “a law to protect assassins, criminals, drug dealers and 
terrorists” (BBC Mundo 2016, 30 March), and referring it to the Supreme Court. 
In late April, the TSJ declared the law unconstitutional, as it showed “contempt 
for the life, integrity, and dignity of… those harmed by the amnestied acts, 
affecting their right to access justice” (Koerner 2016, 22 April). This decision 
was condemned almost universally by the international media and many 
international human rights groups, despite the seriousness of the crimes and the 
persistent attempts to overthrow a series of elected governments, facts which 
were barely mentioned.3 A further example of MUD legislation was the Law to 
Grant Property Titles to Beneficiaries of the Grand Housing Mission Venezuela 
(Asamblea Nacional, 2016b). This quite simply aimed to transfer ownership of 
state housing properties to those currently renting them. This was justified in 
terms of a Constitutional provision granting citizens the right to a dignified 
home. This law was again referred by the President to the Supreme Court, which 
declared it unconstitutional on the grounds that it would eventually benefit the 
real estate market, rather than the Venezuelan people, thus contravening the 
social nature of the Housing Mission (TSJ 2016, 6 May). 
This quick review of some of the main policies and legislative attempts of 
the MUD during 2016 demonstrates the following points. First, its policy 
declarations and some of the laws reviewed here underscore the prioritization 
of the removal of the government as a response to the crisis, and the continuance 
of a multi-layered strategy to achieve this, including institutional and 
mobilizational strategies, as well as seeking amnesty for those who participated 
in previous illegal strategies. Second, they have demonstrated a continued 
adherence to marketization of the economy as the prime policy response to the 
crisis. Both laws also are fundamentally against the founding principles of the 
Bolivarian Revolution, making agreement on them much more difficult for the 
government to accept. Hence, rather than achieving peace and dialogue they 
further deepened the continued struggle between the MUD and the PSUV, 
now incarnated in a struggle between two state powers (the executive and the 
legislature). The result has been stalemate. Despite this, however, there were 
attempts to break this by a third option, that of dialogue.
VII. THE THIRD WAY? 2016’S NATIONAL DIALOGUE PROCESS
In parallel to the recall process and the street campaigns and protests, a variety 
of dialogue initiatives between the two sides developed during the year. One 
was led by three foreign ex- Presidents, Martín Torrijos of Panama, Leonel 
Fernández of the Dominican Republic, and José Luis Zapatero of Spain, under 
the auspices of UNASUR. This was further augmented by a series of negotiations 
facilitated by the Vatican, which began in October, supported by the UNASUR 
3 See for example the judgement of José Miguel Vivanco (2016, 16 April) of Human Rights Watch. 
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mission, that were finally abandoned in February 2017. At the time of writing, 
there are attempts to revive the process, with, for example, opposition leader 
and ex-Presidential candidate, Manuel Rosales being released from prison by 
the government (BBC 2016, 31 December).
Though the proposed national dialogue was initially rejected by leading 
opposition members, the movement gained traction when the government 
released four prominent opposition prisoners. While more radical elements, 
such as Voluntad Popular, rejected the talks, the more mainstream parties—
Justice First (PJ), Democratic Action (AD), and A New Era (UNT)—agreed 
to participate, underlining once again divisions within the coalition around 
strategy. The MUD, in turn, called off the ongoing AN “trial” of President 
Maduro and a planned demonstration against the suspension of the recall 
referendum process. There was also a commitment by both sides to deescalate 
discourse in order to create a more conducive context for the talks. By 24 
October, Ernesto Samper, Secretary General of UNASUR, lauded progress in the 
talks, including “the generation of trust among political actors” and forging an 
agenda which included “a Committee on Truth and Justice…the constitutional 
role of powers, the need to agree on an electoral agenda and immediately adopt 
important economic measures for social relief” (Samper 2016, 24 October). A 
Commission of Guarantees was also “proposed in order to seek institutional 
and permanent solutions to cases that may affect the free exercise of democratic 
debate” (Samper 2016, 24 October).
The talks eventually led to a five-point agreement between those participating. 
First, there was a recognition on the part of the opposition of government 
complaints of “economic war”(meaning actions such as hoarding of key 
products, contraband etc.) as a source of the crisis. With this admission came 
promises to cooperate with the government to combat them and to “monitor, 
tax and control” the acquisition and distribution of goods. There were also 
promises from the government to work with the CNE to help resolve the 
problem of the three suspended opposition deputies, and from government 
and opposition to work together to jointly nominate replacements for two 
deans on the CNE due to retire in December. They both agreed also to defend 
Venezuela’s rights over the territory of Essequibo in neighbouring Guyana 
(Boothroyd Rojas 2016, 14 November). A joint statement was released, “Living 
Together in Peace,” reiterating support for peaceful coexistence, “to lead a great 
national mobilization for agreement, mutual recognition, and peace,” among 
other promises. However, no further meetings were held and the process was 
officially suspended on 6 December, with the opposition complaining that the 
government was not keeping to its side of the agreement, such as “the release 
of so-called ‘political prisoners’ and a timetable for early presidential elections” 
(Charles 2017, February). The government, on the other hand, argued that the 
opposition had not fulfilled their promise to work to stop the “economic war” 
and to live in peaceful co-existence (Charles 2016, 26 December).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Velasco argues that Venezuela’s economic crisis is the result of a “combination 
of a haphazard socialist program built atop a foundation of increased oil 
dependency against the virulent opposition of entrenched elites” (Grandin 
2016, 16 December). Our analysis here bears out this diagnosis. First, we have 
sought to show that government actions have done little to alleviate and much 
to aggravate the current severe socio-economic crisis affecting Venezuela. Chief 
among these is their failure to amend the Venezuelan currency regime, which 
many analysts identify as the root cause for the shortages of food, medicines and 
other key goods, not to mention its central role in enabling corruption. Second, 
we have also sought to show that the opposition, while obviously not in the seat 
of power and therefore in the best position to effect change, have nonetheless 
prioritized destabilizing actions rather than concrete policy proposals—most 
particularly mobilizational actions that regularly resulted in violence. When 
actual policy suggestions did emerge, these were primarily of a market-oriented, 
neoliberal nature, with little evidence produced as to how these would resolve 
the situation positively for poorer Venezuelans. Moreover, legislation produced 
by the MUD-dominated National Assembly had little positive effect and was 
guaranteed—as with the Amnesty Law and the Housing Law—to antagonize 
the government further. Most importantly, neither side seems to offer concrete 
proposals to resolve the country’s main underlying problem of continued oil 
dependency. Divisions in the MUD coalition augur against any improvement 
here, especially as mobilizational and illegal strategies have once again been 
prioritized for the moment.
Hence, in conclusion, we argue that both government and opposition must 
share the blame for the contemporary state of affairs in Venezuela, and, 
as such, both must play their part in offering a solution to the political and 
economic crisis. McCoy (2017: 54) contends that despite most Venezuelans 
wanting dialogue between opposition and government, a polarizing electoral 
logic has been embedded in the populace. This has led to what she terms a 
“pernicious polarization” (McCoy 2017: 54) based on a psychologically, 
spatially, and materially divided population. Perceptions must be altered so 
that the opposing camp is no longer seen as an enemy to be vanquished, but 
rather an as an adversary to compete against and negotiate with in order to 
achieve the collective interest (McCoy 2017). It is therefore necessary to identify 
the conditions that will be conducive to altering these polarized perceptions, 
and we believe the main route to this is through dialogue. There are a number 
of key elements which need to be dealt with to ensure successful dialogue. For 
the government, whose authoritarian tendencies have crept forward during 
2016, and for the higher ranks of the military, exit costs are extremely high, not 
only in terms of losing power, but also with regard to the risk of imprisonment 
due to corruption and drug trafficking charges. For the opposition, there is the 
potential of alienating voters who reject dialogue with what is believed by many 
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to be an authoritarian and illegitimate, regime. Both also face high entry costs 
due to deeply embedded mistrust between the two sides.
In order to move beyond the current impasse, the exit costs for the upper 
echelons of the government, the PSUV, and the military generals must be 
lowered, while the entry costs for the opposition to engage in negotiation must 
also be reduced. It is imperative that an alternative narrative to the polarized 
logic emerge, showing how both sides can exit the current impasse without 
facing political annihilation. While it may appear that there are “two camps 
formed across an impermeable boundary, with mutually exclusive identities 
and interests” (McCoy 2017: 56), the government and opposition are in fact 
fragmented. While this fragmentation makes dialogue less efficient, it may 
offer “more space and flexibility for dialogue across the boundary line and the 
creation of new coalitions” (McCoy 2017).
In both camps, there are sectors which are more disposed to compromise on 
these issues of exit and entry costs. These may be more amenable to agreement 
on issues such as guarantees against charges being pressed on government 
members for alleged crimes if the PSUV were to lose a general election, and 
the release of opposition-linked prisoners. This could be achieved, perhaps, 
as part of a wider Truth Commission, as suggested by UNASUR Secretary 
General Ernesto Samper. Agreement would also have to be reached on the 
nature of the socio-economic regime, particularly with regard to distributive 
and political gains made for popular sectors during the chavista period, as well 
as the constitutional role of the PSUV. Finally, there would need to be agreement 
on respecting election results and the makeup of existing institutionality, 
especially in the electoral and judicial branches. A further important element 
would be consistent support from international actors for such a process and 
to help guarantee its results. It may turn out that this scenario is reminiscent 
of previous pacts, such as that of the 1958 Punto Fijo Pact, which installed the 
regime replaced by the current Bolivarian Republic and which was regarded 
as the source of much of today’s conflict. The alternative, however, is a context 
of continuing confrontation and polarization, with unknown outcomes for the 
peace and stability of the country and the region.
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